Predictive value of firms' manpower expectations and policy implications. Economic Papers No. 44, March 1986 by Nerb, G.
BCN IC
HPBRS
coMMtsstoil 0F THE EURopEAil  COiltMtlt$TtEs o D|REGT0BATE-GEI$ERAL  FoB ECotIoMlc AllD FltIAilClAt  AFFAInS
No 44 March 1986
of firms' manPower exPectations
poLicy imPLications 
-. .{
9; 
Nerb
InternaL Paper
redi ctive vaLue
and"Economic Papers" are written by the Staff of the Directorate-GeneraL
for  Economic and FinanciaL Affairs,  or by experts working in association
with them.  The "Papers" are intended to increase awareness of the
technicat work being done by the staff  and to seek comments  and
suggestions for further anatyses.  They may not be quoted without
authorisation.  Views expressed represent exctusiveLy the posjtions
of the author and do not necessari ty correspond with those of the
Commission of the European Communities. Comments  and enquirjes
shouLd be addressed to
.^Ih" Directorate-GeneraI for Economic and FinanciaL Affairs,
i__Commission of the European Communities,
2OO, rue de ta Loi
1049 BrusseLs, BeLgiumECONOMIC  PAPERS 
"'#  > 
~  'i.c-£;(',.!1-/·.U  f  r:-~ t:..  N°  44  March  1986 
\, 
~Predictive value  of  firms'  manpower  expectations 
and  policy  implications 
~ 
G.  Nerb 
,  I 
Internal  Paper 
The  author  is grateful  to  Mr.  W.  Naggl  ,(Munich  University)  for  his 
collaboration on  Chapter  II  and  to  Mr.  B.  Meganck  (Banque  Nationale 
de  Belgique,  Brussels>,  Mr.  C.P.H.  Burton  CCBI,  London)  and 
Mr.  Devilliers  CINSEE,  Paris)  for  making  available extensive 
statistical material 
J  • .;l. • I 
II/111/86-EN 
CCC' Jl1J/ 
This  paper  only  exists  in  English I  INTRODUCTION 
Und~r the  ~onventional econometric  estimating procedures 
fluctuations  in  manpower  levels  are  explained and  predicted  in  a  two-stage 
process.  With  given  business  expectations  regarding  the  prospective  trends 
in  production  and  real  wages,  the  manpower  levels  aimed  at  by  firms  in  the 
long  term  are  dependent  on  the  marginal  productivity of  Labour,  which  in 
turn  is determined  by  an  appropriate  production  function.  Because  of  the 
costs  of  recruiting,  training and  dismissing  labour,  actual  manpower  Levels 
adjust  to  the  desired  medium-term  levels  with  a  time  lag.  Both  in  theory 
and  in econometric  practice,  this  adjustment  process  is  carried out  on  an 
1  ad  hoc  basis  using  a  separate  adjustment  function 
Attempts  have  been  made  to  improve  such  short-term employment 
functions  by  using  models  to  capture  the  cyclically fluctuating  relationship 
between  production  and  employment  2•  But,  these  too  have  failed  to  produce 
any  significant  improvement  in  the  predictive quality of  such  estimating 
functions.  It  is clearly not  possible  to explain  with  models,  let  alone 
forecast,  short-term fluctuations  in  labour  productivity  (defined  here  as 
output  per  person  employed).  The  main  reason  probably  is  that  firms  are 
largely autonomous  in  their employment  behaviour,  i.e.  independent  of  the 
trend  in  production.  This  finding  has  been  established  inter alia  in  special 
studies  which  demonstrated  that  firms'  willingness  to  hold  on  to  their 
employees  at  times  of  depressed  economic  activity is  dependent  to  a  quite 
significant  degree  on  their  medium-term  growth  prospects.  Even  in  the 
event  of  a  cyclical  recovery  of  demand,  these  medium-term  expectations 
1 
2 
See,  for  example,  A.J.  Phipps,  "The  Relationship Between  Output  and 
Employment  in British Manufacturing  Industry",  Oxford  Bulletin of 
Economics  and  Statistics, vol.  37  (1975),  and  R.M.  Solow,  "Short-run 
Adjustment  of  Employment  to Output",  in  J.N.  Wolfe  (e.d.>,  Value, 
Capital  and  Growth,  Edinburgh,  1968. 
See,  for  example,  F.P.R.  Brechling  and  P.  O'Brien  "Short-Term 
Employment  Functions  in Manufacturing  Industries  :  An  International 
Comparison",  Review  of  Economics  and  Statistics, vol.  49  (1967>, 
and  R.N.  Wand,  "Man-Hour  Behavior  in  U.S.  Manufacturing  :  A Neoclas-
sical  Interpretation",  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  vol.  76  (1968). -2-
are a crucial factor in firm's  decisions  whether  or  not  to  increase their 
workforce  3•  A whole  range  of  exogenous  variables  are  therefore at  work 
and  should  be  taken  into  account  in  any  efficient  forecasting  model. 
In  the  opinion of  forecasters,  the  fundamental  weakness  of 
such  conventional  econometric  estimating methods  thus  lies  in  the  need  to 
make  a  forward  assessment  of  the  exogenous  variables.  Spitznagel  therefore 
draws  the  following  conclusion  from  his  extensive empirical  investigations 
"Since  forecasts  are  generally conditional  in nature,  the  purpose  of  future 
research  must  be  to  shift  the.level  of  conditionality backwards 
in  order  to  reduce  uncertainties  in  the  'if' components.  This  can  be  done 
by  endogenizing exogenous  variables  and/or  by  incorporating predetermined 
variables· or  quantitative or qualitative  leading  indicators  in 
econometric  models"  (translation)  4 
This  paper  sets out  to examine  whether  predetermined exogenous 
variables  such  as  those which  are empirically obtained in  the  form  of  manpower 
plans  5  from  the  business  surveys  conducted  among  firms  in  most  Community 
countries,  can  help  improve  forecasts  of  the  demand  for  labour.  It  is 
confined to  the  employment  trend  in  industry since  this  is the  only sector 
in  most  Community  countries  in  which  surveys  of  manpower  plans  are 
carried out  on  a  regular  basis,  in  general  three  times  a  year  (January/ 
February,  June/July and  October/November)  and  with  a  time  horizon of 
three  to  four  months  5•  Although  in  the  Community  an  average  of  only 
around  one  third of  the  total  employed  labour  force  is  now  working  in 
3  G.  Nerb,  "Beschaftigungspolitische Verhaltensweisen der  Unternehmen  -
Ergebnisse  ~on Ifo-umfragen",  in Langerfristige Perspektiven  fur  den 
Arbeitsmarkt  in der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland,  Beihefte der 
Konjunkturpolitik,  vol.  25,  1978,  pp.  45  et  seq., and  id., 
Konjunkturverlauf  und  Arbeitsmarkt.  Erkenntnisse  aus  U~rnehmer­
umfragen  fur  die Arbeitsmarktpolitik,  Ifo-S~hnelldienst, November  1982 
4  E.  Spitznagel,  "Ansatze  zur  Prognose  konjunktureller  Schwankungen 
der  Nachfrage  nach  Arbeitskraften"  Allgemeines  Statistisches Archiv, 
2,  1976,  p.  212. 
5  The  expressions  "manpower  plans"  and  "manpower  expectations" are  used 
synonymously  in this  paper.  The  term  "expectation"  is therefore 
broadly defined. -3-
industry,  the  decision  to  concentrate on  this  sector  appears  justified, at 
least  for  the  purposes  of  short-term analysis  building and  construction 
apart,  it  is  here  that  cyclical  fluctuations  in  employment  have  usually 
been  sharpest. 
The  study embraced  the  following  Community  countries  :  Belgium, 
Germany,  France,  the  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom.  No  time  series 
are  available  for  manpower  expectations  in  the  other  Community  countries  or 
those  that  are  available  do  not  cover  a  sufficiently  long  period. 
Generally  speaking,  the  period  investigated covers  the  years 
1969-81;  however,  as  the  necessary  data  were  not  always  available,  shorter 
periods  had  to  be  taken  in  some  cases.  In  the  case  of  Germany,  for  example, 
the  study  covers  the  period  up  to  the  autumn  of  1979  only since,  after 
that  date,  the  surveys  were  conducted at  quarterly intervals,  and  not 
every  four  months  as  previously.  For  methodological  reasons,  linkage  of 
the  two  periods  proved  difficult  and  was  not  undertaken  6 
In  Chapter  II, a  number  of  hypotheses  are  tested using  empirical 
data.  In  line  with  the  theory of  rational  expectations,  the  starting 
hypothesis  is  that  firms  make  optimal  use  of all  the  information  available 
when  preparin~ their  manpower  plans.  The  best  forecasting  values  would 
therefore  be  obtained by  direct  reliance  on  manpower  plans.  In  order  to  test 
this  hypothesis  an  alternative estimation  was  carried out  using  other 
determinants.  Care  was  taken  that  only  such  values  of  the  determinants  were 
used  as  were  available  when  the  manpower  plans  were  presented.  The  rational 
expectations  hypothesis  was  also  tested by  incorporating  in  an  estimating 
function  both  the  manpower  plans  and  the  values  of  a  number  of  employment-
relevant  determinants  that  were  available at  the  time  the  plans  were 
presented.  The  other  hypotheses  were  concerned  with  the  forecasting 
superiority of  manpower  plans  in  implementation  functions  and  lastly -
somewhat  modestly  - with  the  usefulness  of  manpower  plans  in employment 
functions. 
6  On  this point  and  on  the  period  investigated,  see  details  in  Chapter 
II. -4-
Generally  speaking it was  found  that  while  firms•  manpower 
plans  do  not  meet  the  requirements  of  the  ratiqnal  expectations  theory  if 
7  "rational" is narrowly  defined as,  for  example  by  Muth  ,manpower 
expectations  do  not  seem  to  be  auto-regressive either.  They  can  best  be 
described as  "modestly-rational" or  "semi-rational".  This  is to  indicate 
that  firms  clearly do  rely on  the  information available at  the  time  when 
forming  their expectations  and  drawing  up  their plans.  Probably on  cost-
benefit  grounds,  however,  they  do  not  use  all of  it and  what  they  do  use 
does  not  appear  to  be  processed  in  as  optimum  a  way  as  the  proponents  of  the 
rational  expectations  theory  imagine.  The  adjustment  process,too,is  clearly 
slower  and  more  erratic  than  is assumed  in  the strict version of  the  theory. 
All  in all, the  investigation  revealed that  firms•  manpower 
plans  normally  make  an  important  contribution  to  improving forecasts  of  cyclical 
fluctuations  in  the  number  of  persons  employed.  However,  because  of  the 
semi-rational  nature  of  manpower  plans,  it is advisable  in  an  estimating 
function  to  use other factors  along  with  empirically ascertained  (survey)  data. 
Taking  the  example  of  Germany,  Chapter  III  Looks  at  the relation-
s  hip  between  manpower  expectations  and  other  business  survey variables. 
It  will  be  seen  that although  a  relatively close  link exists  between 
production expectations  and  manpower  expectations,  this  link 
does  not  seem  to  be  stable over  the  cycle.  The  same  is  true of  the 
relationship between  manpower  plans  and  views  on  the  current  business 
situation.  This  is a  further  argument  in favour  of eliciting information 
on  manpower  plans.through  a  direct  question.  Another  interesting discovery 
is that,  contrary to  neoclassical  theory,  there  seems  to  be  no  close  link 
between  manpower  planning  and  the  wage  trend  (change  in  real  hourly  wages>. 
7  J.F.  Muth,  "Rational  Expectations  and  the  Theory  of  Price  Movements", 
Econometrica,  vol.  39  (1961)  pp.  315  et  seq ••  A useful  review of  the 
theory of  rational  expectations  can  be  found  in T.J.  Sargent  and  N. 
Wallace, ·"Rational  Expectations  and  the  Theory  of  Economic  Policy", 
Journal  of ~oneta~y Economics,  vol.  2  (1976),  pp.  169  et  seq •• -5-
This  must  not,  however,  be  taken  to  mean  that  the  wage  trend  has  no  bearing 
on  the  manpower  trend.  Other  investigations  have  in  fact  identified a 
significant  relationship between  wages  and  changes  in employment  in  the 
medium  term  of  two  to  three  years.  In  the  short  term,  however,  any  such 
relationship is clearly overshadowed  by  a  number  of  other  factors  8 
Lastly,  an  attempt  is  made  in  Chapter  IV  to fit  the  study's 
findings  into the  discussion of  the  theory of  rational  expectations.  The 
conclusion  reached  in  the  study,  namely  that  empirically ascertained plans 
and  expectations  are  not  rational  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  means 
that  we  cannot  forecast  such  plans  and  expectations  but  must  rely on 
continuous,  empirical  collection of  the  relevant  data  9•  The  implication 
for  economic  policy  is  that  empirically ascertained plans  and  expectations 
are  as  it were  macroeconomic  market  research  findings  that  should  be 
carefully studied  in order  to determine  whether  the  policy being  pursued 
is  tending  to produce  a  stabilization of  positive expectations  in  the 
economic  sector  concerned. 
By  way  of  conclusion,  the  study  looks  at  the  implications  which 
the  existence of  "semi-rational" expectations  has  for  the  choice  of 
economic  policy strategies.  One  strategy - which  can  be  described as 
Keynesian  and  demand-oriented- endeavours  to  make  use  of  the  limited 
8  See,  for  example,  H.  Lehment,Der  Einfluss der  Lohnpolitik  auf  Produk-
tion,  Beschaftigung  und  Preise  in  der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  seit 
1973,  Kieler  Diskussionsbeitrage  No  82,  1982. 
9  Similar  inferences  ~an be  drawn  from  other empirical  studies,  espe-
cially  :  K.  Aiginger,  "Empirical  Evidence  On  The  Rational  Expectations 
Hypothesis  Using  Reported  Expectations",  paper  presented to  the  World 
Congress  of  Econometric  Societies,  Aix-en-Provence,  1980. 
F.  Papadia  and  V.  Basano,  EEC-DG  II  inflationary expectations  - Survey 
based  inflationary expectations  for  the  EEC  countries,  Economic 
Paper  No  1  (Internal paper>,  1981. 
P.  Praet,  A Comparative  Approach  to  the  Measurement  of  Price  Expecta-
tions,  Universite Libre  de  Bruxelles,  D.T.  (80)  27,  1980  (Internal 
paper>. 
I.  Wolters,  Zum  Zusammenhang  zwischen  Preiserwartungen des  Ifo-
Konjunkturtests  und  der  tatsachlichen Preisentwicklung,  Discussion 
Paper  No  179-81,  Institut  fur  Volkswirtschaft  und  Statistik, 
Universitat  Mannheim,  1981. -6-
10  trade-off  that  exists, at  least  in  the  short  term  ,  between  the  inflation 
rate  and  the  unemployment  rate. 
Th~ other ·strategy - advocated  in particular by  the  proponents 
of  the  so-called new  classical macro-theory  - focuses  exclusively on 
influencing the "natural"  rate of  unemployment,  i.e. that  degree  of 
underemployment  which  occurs  under  given  structural  conditions  Cin  parti-
cular,  a  given  real  wage  Level,  a  given  capital  stock  and  a  given  supply 
and  demand  structure)  even  when  capital  stock  utilization  is  at  a 
cyclically normal  level.  The  waiver  of  discretionary monetary  and  fiscal 
policy measures,  which  is associated with  this  strategy, appears  Logical 
if,  Like  the  proponents  of  the  new  classical macro-theory,  we  deny  that 
there  is  any  trade-off  between  inflation and  unemployment  even  in  the 
short  term.  Yet  the  findings  of  this  study and  of other empirical  work  have 
demonstrated  that  the  basis  for  an  economic  policy strategy of  this  kind, 
namely  the  assumption  of  strictly rational  expectations,  is  unduly 
rigourous.  However,  even  where  expectations  are  "modestly  rational"  and 
point,  at  least  in part,  to  a  trade-off  between  inflation and  unemployment, 
there  are  perfectly sound  arguments  in  favour  of  pursuing  an  exclusively 
'supply-oriented strategy of  this  kind.  For  a  variety of  reasons,  it  is 
considered  appropriate  in  this  study  to  combine  both  economic  policy 
strategies  in  the  situation of  underemployment  currently facing  the 
Community  countries.  But  pursuit  of  the  first  strategy should not  be 
overdone  as  it often  was  in the  past  and  is still being  advocated  by  some 
Keynesians  today.  The  policy of  demand  stimulation  should  be  pursued only 
until  the  "natural"  Level  of  unemployment  has  been  reached  Cin  Germany  this 
is equivalent  to  some  6.5  X at  the  moment  11 >;  it is not  possible  to  force  the 
actual  level  of  unemployment  below  its "natural"  level  for  any  sustained 
period of  time. 
10  This  follows  from  the  semi-rational  nature  of  empirical  expectations. 
11 
The  Phillips  c4rve  would  be  vertical  in  the  short  term  too  only  if 
expectations  were  strictly rational;  there  would  then  be  no  such 
trade-off  in  the  short  term. 
For  a  more  detailed analysis  of  the  "natural  rate of  unemployment"  CNRU) 
see  G.  Nerb,  Konjunkturverlauf  und  Arbeitsmarkt.  Erkenntnisse  aus 
Unternehmerumfragen  fur  die Arbeitsmarktpolitik  Cifo-Schnelldienst, 
November  1982>.  The  estimation of  the  present  NRU  is  on  Line  with  other 
ones,  e.g.  Layard  :  6,2  X for  the  period 1981-83  in  Germany  CR.  Layard, 
G.  Basevi,  w.  Buiter, 0.  Blanchard,  R.  Dornbusch,  "The  Case  for· Unsus-
tainable  Growth",  Centre  for  European  Policy Studies,  Brussels,  May  1984). (2) 
-7-
Because  of  the  high  level  of  hard-core  unemployment  in all 
Community  countries,  a  policy of  demand  stabilization must  be  accompanied 
by  a  supply-side  policy aimed  at  Lowering  the  "natural"  unemployment 
rate.  It  is  also essential  to take  back-up  Labour  market  measures  to 
reduce  the  labour  force  potential  (in particular,  cuts  in  the  working 
week  and  in  the  Length  of  working  life,  job-sharing  schemes  and  other 
12  arrangements  for  part-time  working) 
II  MANPOWER  EXPECTATIONS  HYPOTHESES  FORMULATED  AND  TESTS 
CARRIED  OUT 
According  to  the  theory of  rational  expectations,  business 
plans  should  provide  the  best  possible  forecast  of  the  future  trend  of 
employment.  Long  before  this  new  theory  was  propounded,  Modigliani  and 
Cohen,  in  a  somewhat  more  cautious  manner,  pointed out  that  empirically 
collected planning data  were  normally  superior  to other  forecasting 
procedures  13 
Empirical  planning data  can  be  used  for  forecasting  purposes 
either direct  or  in  the  form  of  so-called  implementation  functions. 
Where  no  such  data  are  available,  forecasts  are  usually  compiled  by  using 
regression analysis  to determine  the  relationship between  the  target 
variable  and  the  possible determinants  during  a  particular base  period 
12 
13 
A useful  an~lysis of  the  case  for  the various  economic  policy 
strategies, albeit  one  that  comes  to  a  different  conclusion  from 
that  reached  in  this  study,  can  be  found  in  :  L.  Haberle, 
Wirtschaftspolitik  bei  rationalen  Erwartungen  - Konsequenzen  einer 
kritischen  Analyse  der  Theorie  rationaler  Erwartun  en  fur  die  Wahl 
wirtschaftspolitischer Strategien,  Untersuchungsreihe  es  Instituts 
fur  Wirtschaftspolitik,  No.  49,  Universitat  Koln,  1982. 
F.  Modigliani  and  K.J.  Cohen,  The  Role  of  Anticipations  and  Plans 
in  Economic  Behavior  and  their  Use  in· Economic  Analysis  and 
Forecasting,  University of  Illinois,  Urbana,  1961. -8-
and  then  applying  this  to  the  forecasting  period.  The  relationship observed 
need  not,  however,  be  stable over  time.  It  will,  in  fact,  be  unstable 
whenever  the  structural  approach  does  not  take  proper  account  of  all  the 
factors.  The  reason  for  any  misspecification  may  be  that  the  path of  the 
target  variable  is  influenced not  only  by  the  objective variables  that  have 
been  explicitly taken  into account  but  also  by  subjective factors  such  as 
assessments  and  other  determinants.  Such  subjective factors  cannot,  however, 
be  properly forecast  using  existing econometric  methods. 
By  contrast,  the  use  of  empirically collected planning data 
should  present  distinct  advantages.  It is fair  to  assume  that  the 
determinants  in  question  (assessments,  sentiment)  are  already  included  in 
such  data,  properly weighted  - this  is particularly important  - for  each 
decision-maker.  Even  exotic  determinants  that  are  relevant  for  only  a  few 
firms  and  that  cannot  be  taken  into account  using  econometric  methods  are 
reflected in  firms•  planning data. 
Leaving  aside  the  costs  of  collecting and  compiling data,  the 
use  of  empir1cal  planning data  thus  appears  a  priori  as  the  clearly 
superior approach.  However,  this  conclusion  is  subject  to the qualification 
that  it is  conceivable,  contrary to  the  assumptions  made  in  the  theory 
of  rational  expectations,  that  firms  do  ·not  make  optimal  use  of  the  information 
theoretically available  when  drawing  up  their plans.  Although  this  can 
hardly  be  verified at  macro  level,  there  are  many  indications  that  non-opti-
mal  planning at  company  level  is often  responsible  for  ex  post/ ex  ante 
deviations  at  macro  level.  Moreover,  data  that  are  correct at micro  level  may 
yield a  not  altogether  satisfactory  result  at  macro  level,either  because 
the  sample  of  the  firms  covered  is not  representative or  because  the  micro 
planning  data  were  not  properly aggregated.  In  the  case  of  trend  surveys, 
there  is  the  additional  problem  of  quantifying qualitative data  14 
14  On  the  problem  of  transforming qualitative data  into quantitative 
data,  see,  for  example,  J.A.  Carlson  and  M.  Parkin,  "Inflation 
expectations",  Economica  42,  pp.  123-138,  and  G.  Nerb,  Konjunktur-
prognose  mit  Hilfe  von  Urteilen  und  Erwartungen  der  Konsumenten  und 
der  Unternehmen,  Munchen- Berlin,  1975. -9-
In  the  present  econometric  study  of  manpower  plans  at  macro 
level  the  various  causes  of  errors  cannot  be  identified.  The  estimating 
results presented are  rather  to  be  used  to test  a  series of  hypotheses 
concerning  the  quality of  planning data  at  macro  level. 
Hypothesis  A 
tirA~~-'!!.WLQ.~tt.P...l~~..:t.i~l<!_t~~.P-.~~t-t~r:~~~ttt_t~r:-t~~-t~r:a~t 
'Lt.r:itb.lft_i.Jl._qy_~~t.iQ!l_t~Jli!.r1...9.~-irl-Q.YJ!.i2.~t~-~'!P..~qx_~qt_t.~~t-~C!!l-~Et._l!~c!~-~t-ttlEt. 
t.i.Jn.f:._th.f:....D.lm~At.ft.At.~~fiD.t.~d.. 
This  hypothesis  can  be  tested by  comparing  the  estimation on 
planning data  with  estimations  based on  data  other  than  manpower  plans 
provided this  information  is available at  the  time  the  plans  are 
presented. 
The  change  in  the  numbers  employed  can  be  forecast  directly 
from  manpower  plans  using  regression equation  (I)  : 
where~Bt is the  percentage  change  in  the  numbers  employed  in period 
t  as  compared  with  period t-1. The  expression  Pt_1  (t)  denotes  the  manpower 
plans  for  period t  presented at  the  end  of  period t-1.  A constant  term 
needs  to  be  writ~en into equation  I  and  into equations  II, IV,  V and  VII 
since  the  manpower  plans  and  the  change  in  the numbers  employed  are 
measured  on  different  scales.  However,  in  the  other equations  too,  the 
constant  term  made  for  a  better  regression  result. -10-
Direct  forecasting  of  the  trend  in  the  numbers  employed  using 
planning  data  is also possible  where  plans  are  implemented  with  a  time  Lag. 
In  the  case  in  point,  a  change  planned  for  the  next  period  may  conceivably 
occur  only  in  the  next-but-one  period.  But  given  the  question  put  (expected 
change  in  the  numbers  employed  in  the  coming  three  to  four  months),  a  time 
Lag  of  more  than  one  period  (four  months)  appears  unlikely.  This  Leads  to 
regression  equation  (II). 
It  is  thus  assumed  that  the  planning data  adequately describe  the 
extent  of  the  change  in  the  numbers  employed  but  do  not  correctly  indicate 
the  exact  period  when  it is  made.  Equations  I  and  II  are  compared  with 
regression  estimations  in  which  not  only  the  change  in  real  hourly  wages  (W) 
but  also  the  change  in  production  (Q)  and  the  production  expectations  for 
the  coming  three  months  derived  from  business  surveys  figure  as  determinants. 
To  ensure  that  the  values  for  these  three  determinants  are  indeed  available 
at  the  time  the  manpower  plans  are  presented,  they  are  written  into 
equation  III  with  a  time  Lag  of  at  Least  one  quarter. 
Q 
t-1  + 
+  a33  (L) 
The  term  (L)  represents  a  polynomial  of  the  lag  operator  L, 
with  Qt_1  (t), ~  Q and  ~  W denoting  the  production  plans,  as  qscertained 
from  business  surveys,  the  change  in  the  production  index  and  the  change  in 
hourly  wages  adjusted  for  price  changes.  If  regression  equation  III  were 
to  produce  a  better explanation or  forecast  than  equations  I  and  II, the 
initial  hypothesis  ("firms'  manpower  plans  yield  the  best  forecasts  that 
can  be  made  at  the  time  they  are  presented,.)  cannot  be  maintained.  It  must 
also  be  rejected where  inclusion of  variables  Qt_1  (t), ~  Q or ~  W  - each 
Lagged  by  at  least  one  quarter  - in  equation  I  or  II  makes  for  a 
significant  improvement  in  the  estimating  results;  :  this  would  suggest 
that  not  all  the  information  relevant  to  the  trend  in  the  numbers  employed -II-
was  taken  into account  in firms'  planning data  P.  This  hypothesis  can 
be  tested using equation  IV  : 
Hypothesis  8 
!!_m~£r2_1!~!1£_!irm~~-m~ae2~~r_el~a~-~i~19_!h~-~~~1-e2~~i21~ 
~!el~a~!i2a  __  gf_~_£h~as~~-ia_sn~_ayme~r~-~mel2t~~-~~~a~!n~t-~r~_ia£2re2r~!~~ 
ia_imel~m~a!!!i2a_!Ya£!i2a~-
An  implementation  function  makes  allowance  for  the  fact  that 
plans  are  in  part  conditional.  Plans  are altered if determinants  change 
during  the  implementation  period  (i.e. the  period to  which  the  plans  refer). 
In  order  to test  this  hypothesis,  real  hourly  wages  and  the  actual  and 
expected  change  in production  15  - in each  case  during  the  implementation 
period  appear  in  the  function  CV)  together  with  manpower  plans  : 
However,  function  V cannot  be  used  for  compiling 
up-to-date  forecasts  since it incorporates  a  number  of  unlagged  determinants, 
i.e. determinants  not  available at  the  time  of  forecasting.  Hypothesis  8 
cannot  be  rejected if the  estimating performance  of  function  (V)  is significantly 
15  These  are  variables  that  theoretical  considerations  but  also empirical 
studies  have  shown  to  be  significant  for  manpower  plans  <see  Chapter 
Ill). -12-
better  than  one  based  on  an  estimating function  in  which  such  planning 
data  are  not  included 
Hypothesis  C 
!o~lY~iQD_Qf_m!oeQ~~r_el!o~_m!~-~ob!o~~-!b~-~~!im!!ios 
!££Y£!£~_Qf_!D-~!i~!iDS-~meiQ~ID~D!_fYD£!iQD~ 
Whereas  hypotheses  A and  B are  rigourous  in  the  sense  that  the 
empirical  manpower  expectations  are  seen  as  providing  the  - relatively -
best  forecasting  or  explanatory variables,  the  planning data  in  hypothesis 
C are  deemed  to  be  of  only  relative  use  in  the  sense  that  their  inclusion 
makes  for  an  improvement  in  an  existing explanatory function  : 
Like  equations  V and  VI,  equation  VII  can  be  used  solely for 
providing an  a  posteriori  explanation of  changes  in  the  numbers  employed. 
It  cannot  be  used  for  compiling  up-to-date  forecasts  of  such  changes. 
Comments  on  the  ~egression estimations 
Before  the  regression  results  are  discussed,  a  number  of  points 
need  to  be  made  regarding  the  data  used,  the  period  investigated and  the 
estimating equations  applied.  The  question  asked  in  Germany  to obtain 
information  on  manpower  plans,  our  main  concern  in this  study,  is as 
follows  (in  translation)  : L 
-13-
Looking  at  the  underlying  trend,  i.e. excluding  purely 
seasonal  variations,  the  number  of  workers  employed  by  our 
firm  will  in  the  next  three or four  months 
- rise  ; 
- remain  broadly  unchanged  ; 
- ~ecline. 
The  wording  of  the  question  is  largely identical  in all 
Community  countries.  The  question itself forms  part  of  the  so-called 
harmonized  programme  of  EEC  business  surveys  in  the  countries  of  the 
European  Community. 
As  agreed  w;th  the  EEC  Commission,  this  question  must  be  put 
at  least  twice  a  year,  in  the  spring and  in  the  autumn.  Most  member 
countries  now,  however,  ask  it at  least  three  times  or even  four  times 
a  year.  Up  to  and  including 1978,  there  were  three  annual  surveys  in 
France  (March,  June  and  November)  and  a  fourth  has  since  been  inserted 
(January,  March,  June  and  November).  In  Germany,  this  question  ~as put 
twice  a  year  in  the  period 1963-70  (May  and  October)  and  three  times 
a  year  in the  period 1971-79  (January,  May  and  September>;  since  1980,  it 
has  been  asked  four  times  a  year  (January,  April,  July and  October>.  In  the 
NetherlaDds  and  Belgium,  three  surveys  are  conducted  per  year  (february/ 
March,  June  and  October>.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  three  results  per  year 
are available for  this  question  in  the  period  1959-71  (february,  June 
and  October>;  since  then,  four  surveys  have  been  conducted  annually 
(January,  April,  July  and  October). 
The.,periods  investigated were  as  follows  :  1969-81  in  France, 
1971-79  in  Germany,  1974-81  in  the  Netherlands,  1970-81  in Belgium  and 
1971-81  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  apart,  the 
period  in each  case  takes  in  the  years  1971-81.  It is  shorter  in  Germany 
(1971-78)  because  the  survey  method  was  changed  and  official employment 
statistics modified  with  effect  from  1980.  The  tentative estimates  that 
were  none  the  less  made  for  the  period  up  to  the  end  of  1981  yielded  . 
results  that differed only marginally  from  those  for  the  estimating  period -14-
1971-79.  In  the  Netherlands,  appropriate  survey  results  are  available only 
from  1974  onwards.  Italy was  not  included  in  the  investigation since, 
generally speaking,  appropriate  survey  results  are  available  there  only 
twice  a  year  (June  and  October).  In  the  other  member  countries  not  covered 
(Denmark,  Luxembourg,  Ireland and  Greece),  either  no  survey  data  on  this 
question  are  available or  what  data  are  available  do  not  cover  a 
sufficiently  long  period. 
The  above  question  leaves  doubts  as  to  which  values  from 
official statistics  should  be  compared  with  the  business  survey  res·ults. 
One  main  difficulty is  that  it is  not  known  a  priori  how  many  months  the 
manpower  planning period  comprises  for  the  individual  firms  and  to  what 
extent  firms  do  in fact  eliminate  from  their  planning data  purely 
seasonal  variations  in  the  numbers  employed.  In  order  to test  the  predictive 
value  of  firms•  ex  ante  reports,  various  time-series  comparisons  were 
therefore  made  in  an  earlier study - carried out  on  behalf  of  the  Federal 
Labour  Office  of  Germany  16  -between business  survey  results  and  ex  post 
data  from  official statistics. 
The  main  findings  of  that  study  can  be  summed  up  as  follows 
ex  post  values  came  closest  to  firms•  expectations  when  the  reference 
variable  from  official statistics  was  the  average  percentage  change  in  the 
numbers  employed  in  the  next  four  months  as  compared  with  the  average  for 
the  preceding  four  months.  It  would  appear  therefore  that,  in their 
ex  ante data,  firms  are  guided  less  by  the  numbers  Likely  to  be  employed 
by  them  at  the  end  of  the  planning period  than  by  the  average  trend  in  the 
numbers  employed  over  the  next  four  months. 
ALL  the  regression  equations  were  based  on  a  multiplicative 
approach.  This  was  because  the  value  pairs  "survey balance  of  firms•  man-
power  expectations"  (taken  from  the  business  survey)  and  "actual  rate of 
change"  (taken  from  official statistics) point  to  the  existence of 
16  W.  Gerstenberger,  G.  Nerb  and  s.  Schittenhelm,  "Unternehmerische 
Urteile  und  Antizipationen  uber  den  Bedarf  an  Arbeitskraften",  in 
Mitteilungen,  9/1969,  Institut  fur  Arbeitsmarkt  und  Berufsforschung, 
Erlangen,  pp.  671  et  seq. (3) 
-15-
non-linear  relationships.  To  judge  by  the  scatter diagrams,  the 
relationships  between  the  survey  balance  and  the  actual  values  should 
correspond  to  a  higher-order  type  of  function.  A possible explanation 
is that  the  business survey  is a cyclical barometer  that  is  highly  sensitive 
to  small  quantitative  changes.  Even  minor  changes  in  economic  variables 
show  up  clearly in the  business  survey  results.  However,  the  greater  the 
quantitative  changes,  the  smaller  the  relative  increase  in  the  corresponding 
proportions  in  the  reports.  It  was  therefore  assumed  in  the  regression 
equation  that  a  multiplicative  Link  existed between  the  determinants. 
It  is also to  be  noted  that  the qualitative variables  used  were 
balances  from  the  business  surveys  (i.e. differences  between  the  weighted 
positive  and  negative  replies).  Such  balances  can  be  compared  with  rates 
of  change  but  not  with  Levels  from  quantitative  index  series.  For  this 
reason,  the  actual  number  of  persons  employed, the Level  of  production, 
and  real  hourly  wages  as  derived  from  official statistics were  transformed 
into first  differences, i.e. into rates of  change.  ALL  the  data  were 
expressed  in  Log  terms  to  take  account  of  the_non-Linear  relationships 
that  clearly existed.  They  were  not  seasonally adjusted but  seasonal 
dummies  were  written  into the  regression equations  to  allow  for  possible 
seasonal  variations.  The  estimated seasonal  coefficients  are  not  given  below 
since  they  are  of  secondary  importance  to  the  subject  matter  of  our  study. 
Short  description of  the  symbols  used  iri  tables  1-5 
Manpower  plans  for  the  period t, about  which  firms  are 
questioned at  the  end  of  period t-1.  Survey  balances. 
Production expectations  for  the  coming  three  months.  In  the 
United  Kingdom,  business  expectations  are  used  instead of 
production expectations.  In  Belgium,  the  "courbe  synthtHique" 
is  used.  Only  those  months  in  which  the  question  regarding 
manpower  plans  was  put  were .taken.  Survey  balances. -16-
Bt  Number  of persons  employed  in manufacturing  in  period t.  In  Germany 
and  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the  rate of  change~ Bt  is  calculated by 
relating the  average  number  of  persons  employed  during  the  four  months 
following  the  month  in  which  the  survey of  manpower  plans  was  conducted 
to the  figure  for  the  preceding four  months.  In  the  other  countries, 
the  planning data  were  used  to forecast  the  numbers  employed  in  the 
following quarter.  Rate  of  change  in  X. 
Production  index  for  manufacturing.  The  rate of  change  ~  Qt  was 
determined  in  the  same  way  as~ Bt  ;  rate of  change  in  X. 
As  a  rule,  the  index  of  hourly  wages  or  the  wage  and  salary bill  in 
industry deflated by  the  index  of  industrial  producer  prices or  by 
a  proxy.  In  France  and  the  Netherlands,  the  nominal  wage  trend  was 
taken  since neither  country  possesses  a  suitable deflator  for 
industrial  production.  For  the  determination  of~  Wt,  see  the· 
comments  on Ll  at. Rate  of  change  in  X. 
R2:  Correlation coefficient  (corrected by  degrees  of  freedom) T
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Regression  resu~ts 
Hypothesis  A  (Forecasting superiority of  manpower  plans  - Equations  I, 
II, III  and  IV) 
Manpower  plans  explain  much  of  the  variance  in  the  trend of 
the  numbers  employed  (equation  I);  this  is  true  of  all  the  five  countries 
investigated,  although  a  below-average  result  was  recorded  for  the 
Netherlands  CR2  in  estimating  function  I  :  92.9  for  Germany,  90.6  for  the 
United  Kingdom,  85.9 for  France,  80.0 for  Belgium  and  56.5  for  the 
Netherlands).  Inclusion of  manpower  plans  Lagged  by  one  period- this 
was  done  only  for  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom  - made  for  only  a  small 
improvement  in  the  estimating  results  in  each  case  (measured  in  terms  of 
2  the  SEE;  R >.  In  both  cases,  however,  the  Durbin-Watson  measure  for 
autocorrelation  showed  a  significant  improvement.  The  negative  sign  for  the 
Lagged  manpower  plans  Pt_2  (t-1)  refutes  the  assumption  that  errors  occur 
in  respect  of  the  Length  of  the  planning  period.  It  rather  suggests  some 
degree  of  regressivity  in  manpower  plans,  i.e.  a  Lasting  reversal  of  the 
direction of  expectations  that  produces  a  negative  correlation between  the 
actual  change  in  the  target  variable  and  the  Lagged  planning  data  17 
The  estimation of  the  change  in  the  numbers  employed  that  was 
carried out  for  control  purposes  using variables  other  than  empirically 
ascertained manpower  plans  yielded results  that  differed  between  the 
countries  concerned  (estimating function  III).  In  the  case of  Germany, 
function  type  III  cames  out  slightly better  than  function  types  I  and  II if we 
Look  at  the  standard deviation of  the  residuals,  the  coefficient  of 
determination  and  the  Durbin-Watson  measure. 
A similar  result  is obtained for  France.  In  Belgium  and  the 
Netherlands,  the  superiority of  estimations  based on  function  III  was  not 
only  gradual  in  kind  but  also  very  tangible.  It  was  only  in  the  case  of  the 
17  On  the  matter  of  regressivity  in  plans  and  expectations,  see  also 
J.  Bossons  and  F.  Modigliani,  On  the  Reasonableness  of  Regressive 
Expectations,  paper  presented at  the  Second  CIRET  Conference, 
Vienna  1963. -23-
United  Kingdom  that  an  ex  post  forecast  of  the  trend  in  the  numbers 
employed,  comptled  using empirically ascertained planning data, 
yielded significantly better  results  than  an  alternative estimation based 
on  function  III.  Especially the decCihe"in--the number  of  persons  empl'oyed 
in  the  United  Kingdom  in  1980  and  1981  cannot  be  explained  using  regression 
equation III;  this yields  a  low  value  for  the  Durbin-Watson  statistic for 
that  country. 
The  estimating  results obtained  using  function  type  IV  were 
found  to  be  superior  to  regression equations  I, II  and  III  in all the 
countries  investigated.  It  is evident,  therefore,  that  the  explanatory 
and  forecasting  power  of  manpower  plans  can  be  enhanced  by  incorporating 
additional  explanatory variables  in  an  implementation  function.  Like  a 
host  of other  empirical  investigating results, this  result  refutes  the 
theory that  the  expectations  of  economic  agents  are  rational  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  term.  The  assumption  of  modestly  rational 
expectations  would  seem  to  be  more  realistic  (see  Chapter  IV).  This  study 
has  also demonstrated that,  in  their manpower  expectations,  firms  do  not 
make·  use,  or  do  not  make  optimal  use,  of  all  the  information available 
to  them  when  plans  are  presented. 
The  predictive value  of  the  additional  determinants  investigated, 
viz.  production expectations  (or  business  expectations  in  the  case  of  the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  "courbe  synthetique"  in  the  case  of  Belgium,  where 
the  time  series of  production expectations  are  not  long  enough),  the  actual 
change  in  production  and  the  trend  in  real  hourly  wages,  is not  the  same  in 
all  the  countries.  In  Germany,  but  also  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  France, 
the  influence  of  production or  business  expectations  in particular  could  be 
clearly demonstra·ted  statistically in  function  type  III.  By  contrast,  in  the 
Netherlands,  the  trend  in  the  numbers  employed  is  much  more  strongly 
influenced by  the  past  trend of  production  than  by  the other  explanatory 
variables.  In  the  light  of  the  present  study,  no  clear-cut  conclusion  can 
be  drawn  regarding the  significance of  real  wages  for  the  demand  for  labour. 
The  coefficient  of  real  wages  even  has  a  positive  sign  in  Germany  and 
France.  This  would  be  consonant  with  the  purchasing  power  theory,  which  is 
championed  by  the  unions  in  particular  and  according  to  which  the  employment 
effect  is the  greater  the  sharper  the  rise  in  real  wages.  Such  a  finding, -~-
which  is  in  absolute  opposition  to  the  new  classical  macro  theory,  must  not, 
however,  be  exaggerated.  Even  convinced  proponents  of  this  new  theory 
concede  that  the  negative  relationship  which  they  claim exist  between  the 
real  wage  level  and  the  trend  in  the  numbers  employed- i.e. the  lower 
the  level  of  real  wages,  the  higher  the  numbers  employed  holds  only  in  the 
medium  term  and  is overshadowed  in  the  short  term  by  various  other 
factors  18•  In  the  United  Kingdom,  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands,  we  obtain 
for  the  influence  of  real  wages  at  least  the  negative  sign postulated by 
neo-classical  theory.  But  even  in  these  three  countries  the  influence of 
wages  could  be  only  weakly  demonstrated  using  the  statistical test  measures. 
The  conclusion  concerning  hypothesis  A is that  a  forecast  based 
solely on  manpower  plans  does  not,  as  the  rational  expectations  theory  would 
suggest,  yield the  best  possible estimating values.  In  all the  cases 
investigated,  a  better result  is obtained  by  combining  the  planning data 
with  other determinants  (estimating  function  IV)  than  by  using  these  data 
direct;  in  most  cases,  however,  the  improvement  thus  achieved  was  only 
limited since,  with  the  exception of  the  Netherlands,  the  direct  approach 
itself yielded good  estimating  results.  Hypothesis  A in  the  narrowly  sense 
(manpower  plans  cannot  be  replaced by  different,  lagged variables,  i.e. 
comparison  of  the  estimating  results  of  functions  I  and  II, on  the  one 
hand,  and  those  of  function  III, on  the  other)  had  to be  rejected 
except  in  the  case  of  the  United  Kingdom. 
18  Roth  and  Lehment,  for  example,  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
strongest  positive employment  effects of  wage  restraint  make  themselves 
felt· only  two  to  three  years  later.  This  would  be  an  argument  among 
other  things  against  a  one-off  wage  freeze  and  in  favour  of  a 
moderate  wage  policy covering  a  longer  period.  (See  H.  Lehment, 
Der  Einfluss  der  Lohnpolitik  auf  Produktion,  Beschaftigung  und  Preise 
in der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland seit  1973,  Kieler  Diskussionsbeitrage 
No  82,  February  1982,  and  J.  Roth,  Mehr  Beschaftigung  durch  Reallohn-
zuruckhaltung,  Kieler  Diskussionsbeitrage  No  85,  March  1982). Testing  hypothesis  B 
-25-
(forecasting superiority of  manpower  plans  in 
implementation  functions) 
The  results obtained using estimating function  IV  are  an 
indication of  the  empirical  relevance  of  hypothesis  B,  according  to  which 
the  best  possible  results  are obtained by  incorporating data  on  manpower 
planning  in an  implementation  function.  This  is  to  be  investigated by 
comparing  the  estimating  results obtained using  functions  V and  VI. 
It should  be  remembered  that  the  only  difference  between  function  IV  and 
function  V is that  equation  IV  is  a  pure  forecasting  function  into  which 
only values  are  written that  were  available  before  the  beginning  of  the 
forecasting  period.  In  implementation  function  V,  however,  the  values  for 
the variables  production expectations  or  business  expectations  (the  latter 
in  the  case  of  the  United  Kingdom),  actual  change  in production  and  actual 
change  in  real  wages  extend  into the forecasting  period.  Consequently,  the 
up-to-date values  of  these  three  variables  are  not  known  in  a  genuine 
forecasting situation.  The  purpose  of  function  V is  to  reveal  the  influence 
of  changes in the "general  economic  environment"  that  occured after 
presentation of  the  manpower  plans  but  during  the  implementation  phase 
(forecasting period).  The  estimations  made  using  function  type  VI  serve 
to test  hypothesis  B in that  they  represent  an  attempt  to proviAe  an 
alternative explanation  for  the  trend  in  the  numbers  employed  (i.e. no 
use  is made  of  manpower  planning data).  Both  function  V and  function  VI  are 
in the  nature of  explanatory models,  not  forecasting  models. 
As  the  empirical  regression  results  show,  hypothesis  B probably 
holds  only for  the  United  Kingdom,  where  an  explanation  system  base~ solely 
on  the  trends  in production  and  wages andon produ:ct'ion  expectations  yields 
a  distinctly worse  result  than  if manpower  plans  are  used  direct.  In  France, 
too~ though  to a  much  Lesser  degree,  implementation  function  V is found  to 
be  superior  to  control  function  VI  (assessment  criterion  :  standard 
deviation of  the  residuals>.  In  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands,  implementatiorl 
function V is clearly inferior to  function  type  VI  in explaining 
fluctuations  in employment.  It  is  worth  noting that  current  production  Qt 
influence  implementation  function  V very  significantly in Germany  and  in 
the  United  Kingdom.  The  same  is not  true,  however,  of  the  real  wage  trend  : -26-
as  was  the  case  in  functions  III  and  IV,  we  even  find  a  "false", i.e. 
positive,  sign  in  Germany.  This  suggests  that,  unlike  changes  in  the  real 
wage  trend,  unexpected  changes  in  production affect  the  implementation  of 
manpower  plans  (at  least  in  the  short  term). 
Testing  hypothesis  C  (Improving  the  existing employment  functions  by 
inclusion  of  manpower  plans  as  an  explanatory variable) 
According  to  this  hypothesis,  manpower  plans  enhance  the  quality 
of  existing employment  functions.  The  difference  between  function  type  IV 
and  function  type  VII  is  simply  that  the  former  is  a  forecasting  function 
and  the  latter an  explanatory function.  This  is  apparent  from  the  fact  that 
only values  available before  the  beginning  of  the  forecasting  period  were 
used  on  the  right-hand side of  the  equation  in  function  IV.  In  function  VII, 
on  the  other  hand,  use  is  also  made  of  current  values  of  the  explanatory 
factors,  that  is  to  say  of  values  relating  to  the  implementation  stage of 
the  manpower  plans,  i.e. the  forecasting  period.  As  the  empirical  results 
show,  manpower  plans  in all  the  countries  except  the  Netherlands  make  a 
significant  explanatory contribution  in  function  VII.  This  is particularly 
so  in  the  United  Kingdom  but  also  in  France. 
Comparison  of  the  results  for  implementation  function  VII  and 
those  for  forecasting  function  IV  reveals  that  there  are  generally only 
small  differences  in  the  standard error and  in  the  coefficient  of 
correlation.  As  could  be  expected,  these  measures  are  usually  somewhat 
better  in  the  case  of  the  explanatory  function  than  in  the  case  of  the 
forecasting  function  (the only exception  being  the  Netherlands).  The 
contribution  made  by  manpower  plans  to  reducing  the  variance  is  broadly 
identical  in-both  types  of  function;  in  the  case  of  Germany  and  the 
United  Kingdom,  it is noticeable  that  if current  production  levels  are 
taken  into account, ·this  indicator  gains  in  significance  relative  to 
production expectations  (estimating function  VII). 
To  sum  up,  it  was  only  in  the  United  Kingdom  that  manpower 
plans  yielded a  better estimation of  the  change  in  the  numbers  employed -27-
than  the other variables  looked  at,  irrespective of  whether  the  latter 
entered the  estimation as  lagged  or  unlagged  variables  (I  and  II  as 
against  Ill). In  the  case  of  the  United  Kingdom  too,  however,  that  part 
of  hypothesis  A according  to  which  manpower  plans  already  contain all  the 
relevant  information  had  to  be  rejected.  Hypothesis  B (manpower  plans  are 
superior to other variables  in  the  trend  in  the  numbers  employed)  had  to 
be  discarded  in  ~he cases  of Belgium  and  the  Netherlands.  For  Germany  and 
France,  the  results  yielded  by  both  approaches  were  more  or  less  equally 
good;  only  in  the  United  Kingdom  do  the  results once  again  point  clearly to 
the  superiority of  manpower  plans.  Lastly,  hypothesis  C (employment  plans 
make  a  significant  but  not  a  dominant  contribution  to explaining 
fluctuations  in  the  numbers  employed)  had  to  be  rejected only  in  the  case 
of  the  Netherlands.  The  fact  that,  in all  countries  except  the  Netherlands, 
the  manpower  plans  in forecasting  function  IV,  i.e.  combined  with  other 
determinants,  make  a  statistically well-founded  contribution  is  particularly 
important  for  up-to-date  forecasting.  Such  an  "indirect" estimation  based 
on  manpower  plans  is  invariably superior  to  a  direct  forecast  (where 
manpower  plans  are  simply  quantified without  ~ny other  factors  being  taken 
into  account>.  This  suggests  that  manpower  expectations  are  not  rational  in 
the  strict sense  of  the  theory  but  can  best  be  described as  semi-rational 
Cse~ Chapter  IV>. 
III  DETERMINANTS  OF  MANPOWER  EXPECTATIONS 
According  to neo-classical  macro-theory,  the  employment  trend 
is crucially dependent  on  whether  firms'  price expectations  are  fulfilled, 
the  argument  being that  concessions  made  by  employers  in  wage  negotiations 
are  based  on  anticipated price  levels  that  will  guarantee  them  the  rate of 
return  they are  seeking.  If, as  a  result  of  a  restrictive monetary  policy 
or  an  unforeseen  drop  in sales, e.g.  on  export  markets,  only  lower-than-
planned price  increases  prove  possible  on  the  market,  the  level  of  real 
wages  (wage  costs  deflated by  the  index  of  industrial  producer  prices> 
rises.  Managements  will  then  attempt  to  reduce  their workforce  to  the 
extent  necessary to bring  wage  costs  expressed as  a  proportion of  total -28-
costs  back  to  the  level  initially planned.  Indeed,  it  is quite  likely that 
they  will  attempt  to  compress  the  share  of  wage  costs  further  through 
rationalization measures  in order  to  come  closer  to  their original profit 
target  in  spite of  the  deterioration  in  market  conditions. 
However,  there  is  little in  the  results  of  this econometric 
study  to  suggest  such  a  manpower  policy,  at  least  in  the  short  term.  Other 
empirical  studies  have  also  demonstrated that  the  real  wage  level  does  not 
significantly  influence  the  level  of  employment,  at  least  in  the  short  term. 
With  this  time  horizon,  the  employment-boosting effect  of  wage  restraint 
is  clearly overlaid by  a  number  of  other  factors.  Most  of  this effect  makes 
itself felt  only after  some  two  to  three  years  of  an  uninterrupted policy 
19  of  wage  restraint 
Even  the  implementation  function  presented  in this  paper 
produced  very  little, if any,  statistical evidence  that  real  wages  were 
an  additional  determinant  alongside  manpower  and  production expectations. 
This  may,  however,  be  due  to  the  fact  that  manpower  expectations  already 
take  the  influence  of  real  wages  fully  into account.  For  this  reason,  the 
relationship between  the  planned  manpower  trend and  the  trend  of  real  wages 
'  was  looked  at  once  again,  but  separately this  time.  Yet  no  statistical 
evidence of  such  a  relationship  was  discovered.  The  same  goes  for  the 
influence of  price expectations  on  manpower  planning.  Differences  between 
price expectations  and  prices  actually fetched  produced  an  even  less 
satisfactory explanation  than  price expectations  themselves.  This  probably 
has  to  do  with  the  fact  that  price expectations  are  surveyed each  month 
.  ( 
and,  as  a  result,  changes  in price expectations  show  up  very quickly  in 
this  series.  Consequently,  the  remaining  differences  between  price 
expectations  prices actually fetched  usually  very  small. 
We  also  looked  at  the  extent  to  which  the  manpower  expectations 
reported  were  influenced  by  the  data  yielded  by  the  business  survey  on  : 
19  For  a  similar finding,  see,  for  example,  H.  Lehment,  Der  Einfluss 
der  Lohnpolitik  auf  Produktion,  Beschaftigung  und  Preise  in der 
Bundesrepublik  Deutschland sit  1973,  (1982),  loc.  cit •• -29-
- trend of  production  compared  with  a  month  earlier  (survey  balances>; 
- production expectations  for  the  next  three  months  (survey  balances>; 
- current  business  situation  (survey  balances>; 
- trend of  business  expected  in  the  next  six  months  (survey  balances>; 
- assessment  of  current  order-book  situation  (survey  balances>; 
-plant capacity utilization  Cas  X of  normal  operating  limits>. 
It  was  found  that  manpower  planning  was  consistently  much  more 
closely related to  these  indicators  than  to  changes  in  real  wages  or  to 
selling-price expectations.  This  suggests  that  the  current  order  position 
and  business expectations  are  the  dominant  factors  behind  short-term 
adjustments  in  the  numbers  employed.  It  is  worth  noting  that  in virtually 
all  cases  the  correlation  was  closest  whenever  no  Lags  were  assumed  in 
the  relationship between  manpower  expectations  and  determinants.  This  is 
an  indication that  a  Large  proportion of  the  information  contained  in  the 
other variables  immediately  feeds  into  manpower  expectations.  None  the 
less,  as  we  saw  when  discussing  the  regression  investigations,  a 
significant  improvement  in  the  manpower  forecast  is obtained if other  test 
variables,  and  in particular production  expectations,  are  taken  into 
account  separately.  It is evident  therefore  that  prompt,  though  not  full, 
account  is  taken  of  the  determinants  in question  when  manpower  expectations 
are  presented  (see Table 6  and  Fig.  1  >. -30-
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Table  6 
Relationship between  manpower  expectations  and 
possible  determinants  - the  case  of  Germany 
Manpower  expectations 
(survey  balances,  BS)  correlated with 
Change  in  real  hourly  wages 
<X;  official statistics> 
- unlagged 
- lagged  by  four  months 
Selling-price expectations 
<sur.vey  balance,  BS) 
- unlagged 
- lagged  by  four  months 
Trend  of  production  compared  with 
preceding month  <X;  official statistics) 
- unlagged 
- lagged  by  four  months 
Production expectations 
(survey  balance,  BS) 
- unlagged 
- lagged  by  four  months 
Assessments  of  current  business  situation 
(survey  balance,  BS) 
- unlagged 
- lagged  by  four  months  • 
Expectations  of  business  trend  in  next 
six months  (survey  balance,  BS) 
- unlagged 
- lagged  by  four  months 
Assessment  of  current  order-book  situation 
(survey-balance,  BS) 
- unlagged 
- lagged  by  four  months 
Capacity utilization  <X;  BS) 
- unlagged 
- lagged  by  four  months 
as  =  Ifo business  survey 
Coefficient  of  correlation 
0,01 
0,02 
0,11 
0,02 
0,54 
0,51 
0,60 
0,78 
0,73 
0,23 
0,36 
0,56 
0,73 
0,23 
0,46 
0,17 IV 
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POSITION  WITH  REGARD  TO  THE  RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  THEORY 
AND  ECONOMIC  POLICY  CONCLUSIONS 
The  expectations  of  economic  agents  play  a  central  role  in 
modern  economic  theory and  in  the  economic  policy  recommendations  based 
thereon.  The  rational  expectations  theory  represents  a  very  rigorous 
system  for  explaining  the  phenomenon  of  stagflation,  that  is  to  say  the 
mixture  of  inflation,  stagnation and  unemployment,  with  which  we  have  had 
to  contend  since  the  mid-1960s  and,  above  all,  in  the  1970s.  According 
to  this  theory,  the  failure  of  Keynesian  employment  policy  in  the  period 
since  the  mid-1960s  can  be  put  down  to  the  fact  that  economic  agents,i.e. 
both  managements  and  consumers,  are  no  longer  subject  to  money  illusion. 
Expansionary  monetary  and  fiscal  policy measures,  so  this  theory tells us, 
no  longer  trigger a  rise  in  production  and  an  increase  in  the  number  of 
persons  employed  but  simply  lead  to  higher  prices. 
In  its "strict version",  the  rational  expectations  theory 
based  on  very  restrictive assumptions.  It  is  assumed,  for  example,  that 
economic  agents  are  in  possession of all  the  information available,  make 
the  best  poss"ible  use  of  that  information  and  hence  are  aware  of  the  "true" 
model  of  economic  relationships.  It is also  assumed  that  firms  and 
consumers.do  in  fact  act  in  line  with  these  expectations.  The  Phillips  curve 
would  thus  be  vertical, not  only  in  the  long  term  but  also  in  the  short.  In 
other  words,  there  is  no  trade-off  between  the  inflation  rate  and  the 
unemployment  rate,  the  consequence  being  that  an  expansionary  monetary  and 
fiscal  policy simply  generates  higher  inflation and  does  not  reduce 
unemployment. 
Just  how  realistic are  these  assumptions  regarding  the  expec-
tations  of  economic  agents  Numerous  empirical  studies  have  revealed  that 
neither  the  expectations  of  firms  nor  those  of  consumers  are  rational  in 
the  sense  postulated by  the  theory.  To  date,  in  addition  to  price expec-
tations,  which  are  the  main  focus  of  interest, empirically ascertained .,-- 33  -
investment  and  production  expectations  have  been  studied 20 •  The 
analysis  of  manpower  expectations  made  in this  study also  refutes  the 
argument  that  expectations  are  rational  in  the  sense  postulated in  the 
strict version of  the  theory.  Clearly,  in  forming  their expectations, 
economic  agents  do  not  take all  information  into consideration or  are 
unaware  of  the  "real" model  essential  to  the  proper  evaluation of 
information.  Although  it is not  possible  to distinguish empirically 
between  these  two  influenc~s, it  is a  fact  that all  the  empirical 
studies of  which  the  author  is aware  contain systematic  errors  in  the 
expectations.  This  shows  up  in the  fact  that  the  deviations  between 
anticipated and  actual  values  are  not  random  but  have  a  systematic 
component. 
However,  this  systematic  error is usually not  very  great.  For 
example,  provided  the statistical base  is sufficiently  representative  and 
provided a  suitable measuring  scale  is  used,  the  correlation between 
empirically ascertained expectations and outturns is,as a rule,surprisingly  close. 
However,  as  noted earlier, systematic  divergence~ are  discernible  in  most 
cases, e.g.  underestimations  during a  cyclical  upswing  and  overestimations 
during a  cyclical  downsing.  This  study  has  demonstrated  that  the  relation-
ship between  ex  post  and  ex  ante  data  can  be  improved  appreciably  by 
including additional  information  in an  implementation  function. 
There  are  a  number  of  explanations  for  the  lack  of  complete 
agreement  between  expectations  and  outturns.  In  contrast  to what  the 
rational  expectations  theory assumes,  some  of  the  costs  involved  in 
obtaining and  evaluating  information  and  in making  the  adjustment  deemed 
necessary are  f~irly high.  On  cost-benefit  grounds,  therefore,  some 
information  is not  utilized or  adjustment  processes  are  not  initiated 
or are  initiated with  considerable delay.  Yet,  even  if economic  agents 
were  prepared to shoulder  these  costs,  there  would  still be  divergences 
between  ex  post  and  ex  ante  values  since,  at  least  where  economic  theory 
20  See,  for  example,  K.  Aiginger,  Empirical  Evidence  on  the  Rational 
Expectations  Hypothesis  using  Reported  Expectations,  1980,  loc.  cit., 
or  P.  Praet,  A comparative  Approach  to the  Measurement  of  Price 
Expectations,Universite Libre  de  Bruxelles,  loc.  cit  •• -34-
stands at  the  moment,  no  one  possesses  the  true  forecasting  model  into 
which  the  information  needs  to  be  fed. 
All  in all, the  findings  of  this  study,  like plenty of  other 
empirical  studies,  are  arguments  in  support  of  a  "weak"  version of  the 
rational  expectations  theory.  The  relevant  literature refers  to 
"semi-rational" expectations  21 •  It  is assumed  here  that  economic 
agents  do  not  possess  all  the  relevant  information  and  that  adjustments  do 
not  take  place  as  promptly  as  is postulated  in  the "strict" version of  the 
theory.  Rather,  cost-benefit  considerations  of  economic  agents  determine 
the  amount  of  information  they  possess  and  hence  the  duration of  both 
the  learning and  adjustment  processes. 
The  extent  to  which  such  cost-benefit  considerations are  taken 
into account  fluctuates  during  the  course  of  a  business  cycle.  This  is 
mainly  because  the  learning processes  of  economic  agents  are  not 
mechanical  and  because  the  readiness  of  both  firms  and  consumers  to  take 
risks  varies  unpredictably over  the  cycle.  Rational  expectations  (in  the 
"strict" version of  the  theory)  represent  a  theorical  but  in practice 
highly  improbable  borderline  case  of  semi-rational  expectations. 
It  is  this  cyclical  flexibility  in ·particular  that  also 
distinguishes  semi-rational  expectations  from  the  autoregressive 
"expectations"  frequently employed  in econometrics  (adaptive,  regressive 
and  extrapolative>.  These  theoretical  constructions of  expectations  are, 
of  course,  esttmated  in a  purely mechanistic  manner  using  past  values  of 
the  same  variable.  For  this  reason,  they  usually  contain  a  substantial 
systematic  error~ By  contrast, empirically ascertained data  on 
expectations,  such  as  those  collected  in  the  context  of  the  EEC  business 
and  consumer  surveys,  represent  genuine  expectations.  As  noted earlier, 
it  cannot  be  assumed  however  that  all  respondents  make  use  of all  the. 
21  See,  for  example,  L.  Haberle,  Wirtschaftspolitik bei  rationalen 
Erwartungen,  Konsequenzen  einer  kritischen Analyse  der  Theorie 
rationaler  Erwartungen  fur  die  Wahl  wirtschaftspolitischer 
Strategien,  loc. cit., pp.  193  et  seq  •• -35-
relevant  information.  On  average,  their  level  of  information  is  much 
lower  than  is assumed  in  the "strict" version of  the  rational  expectations 
theory.  Whatever  the  level  of  information,  there  will  also  be  significant 
differences  in  the  way  economic  agents  handle  information,  ranging  from 
simple  trend forecasts  to  highly  complex  forecasting  systems. 
What  inferences  for  empirical  economic  research  and  for  economic 
policy are  to  be  drawn  from  the  conclusion  reached  in  this  study  and  in 
various  other studies,  namely  that,  as  a  rule,  expectations  from 
representative  surveys  represent  data  that  can  best  be  described  as 
"semi-rational" ? 
The  main  implications  for  empirical  economic  research  are that 
a  mechanistic  expectation-forming  process  (autoregressive  expectations) 
cannot  be  assumed  and  that  decisions  and  actions  are  not  taken  in  such 
a  rational  fashion  as  postulated  in  the  rational  expectations  theory. 
If the  theory  were  right  on  the  Latter  point,  tt  would  be  sufficient, 
given  an  effective price mechanism,  to  keep  a  close  watch  solely on  price 
movements  in order  to ascertain the  expectations  of  economic  agents. 
For  the  above  reasons,  both  the  expectation-forming  process 
and  the  decision-making  process  are  much  more  complex  and  cannot  be 
predicted using  conventional  econometric  methods.  There  is  therefore  no 
substitu~e for  empirically ascertained data  on  expectations  such  as  those 
yielded by  the  EEC  business  and  consumer  surveys.  However,  as  this  study 
has  clearly demonstrated,  making  optimal  use  of  the  planning  data  does  not 
mean  converting  them  directly into quantitative forecasts. 
Instead, it is better to  incorporate  planning  data  into an 
estimating model  together  with  other  information. 
The  main  implication that  the  "semi-rational" nature  of 
empirically ascertained data  on  expectations  has  for  economic  policy  is 
that,  contrary to  what  is asserted by  proponents  of  the  new  classical 
macro  theory,  there  is  at  Least  some  room  for  discretionary measures  to 
boost  the  level  of  employment.  The  short-term Phillips  curve  is  not 1 4 
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Germany  Fig.  3. 
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Legend  :  The  dotted  lines  are  to be  seen  as  indicating the  "natural" 
unemployment  rate. It is necessary to  imagine  a  series of  Phillips  curves 
around  these vertical  lines  (see  Fig.  2)  which,  in the  short  term  at  least, 
point  to a  modest  tra~e-off between  inflation and  the  unemployment  rate. -38-
therefore vertical but,  as  expected,  slopes,  downwards  to the  right  (see 
Fig.  2).  The  narrow  room  for  discretionary measures  to  secure  a  trade-off 
between  the  inflation  rate  and  the  unemployment  rate  is  illustrated in  Fig.  3, 
which  depicts  the  situation  in Germany.  The  empirical  results  suggest  that  the 
so-called natural  rate of  unemployment,  i.e.  the  degree  of  underemployment 
that  is to  be  expected  even  when  the  stock  of  physical  capital  in  the  economy 
is being utilized at  a  normal  cyclical  Level,  is  around  6.5%  in Germany.  This 
estimate  is based  on  the  unemployment  rate during  the  cyclical  peak  in  1979 
and  takes  into account  the  increase  in  the  capital  stock  and  the  supply  side 
of  the  Labor  market  since then.  This  estimation  is  in  Line  with  other  ones 
e.g.  Layard  :  6,2%  for  the  period  1981-83  in  Germany  22 .  Consequently,  if the 
economy  returned to normal,  the  current  unemployment  rate  in  Germany  of  just 
under  8%  would  fall  by  only  around  1.5  percentage points.  There  is the  danger 
that,  while  an  exclusively  demand-stimulating  policy of  the traditional 
Keynesian  kind  may  temporarily  succeed  in  forcing  the  unemployment  rate  below 
its "natural"  Level,  it, in  the  medium  and  Long  term,  Lead  to an  even  higher 
"natural"  rate of  underemployment.  A better strategy would  therefore  probably 
be  to bring  down  unemployment  to its "natural  rate"  through  a  relatively 
moderate  stimulus  to  demand  and  at  the  same  time  to  take  steps  to  Lower  the 
natural  rate of  unemployment.  This  necessitates  in  the first  place  a  consistent 
growth  strategy.  As  the  problem  of  Lowering  the  "natural
11  rate of  unemployment 
does  not  come  within  the  ambit of this  study,  a  reference  to a  few  key  elements 
may  suffice  here  :  removal  of  obstacles  to  investment,  primarily  in  the 
construction of  power  plants,  roadbuilding  and  telecommunications;  improvements 
in depreciation  rules,  above  all  for  risky,  Long-term  investments;  and 
introduction of  tax  incentives  for  job-creating product  innovations.  The  Last 
move  might  among  other  things  encourage  the  formation  of  innovation  companies 
that,  helped  by  tax  concessions,  would  attract  risk  capital  in  the  same  way  as 
companies  set  up  specifically to  take  advantage  of  depreciation  rules  do  at  the 
moment.  Such  capital, which  should  be  raised especially  from  among  those  in  the 
higher  income  brackets  who  have  no  firm  of  their own  to  invest  in,  would  need 
to  be  channelled,  as  a  matter  of  priority,  to  small  and  medium-sized  firms  that 
have  promising  plans  for  new  products  but  do  not  possess  sufficient  capital to 
implement  product  innovations  (manufacture  and  tapping  of  markets).  As  is demon-
strated by  a  host  of  depreciation-based  projects  some  of  which  are of  doubtful 
22·  See  footnote  11 -39-
value  for  the  national  economy,  sufficient  risk capital  is  forthcoming  if 
its owners  are offered appropriate  tax  incentives.  The  deficiency  so  far 
has  been  in  the  channelling of  risk capital. It  is  high  time  that  we 
created new  forms  of  financing  for  innovation projects  that  involve  risk. 
Otherwise,  the  necessary  surge  in  innovation  and  the  resulting creation 
of  jobs  with  future  potential  will  not  materialize  and  the  main  emphasis 
of  investment  activity will  continue  to  be  on  the  rationalization and,  at 
best,  modernization  of  existing plant. 
Yet  even  a  successful  growth  policy of  this  kind,  coupled  with 
a  moderate  wage  policy,  will  not  by  itself sufficiently alleviate 
Labour-market  problems  over  the  next  few  years.  It  will  need  to  be 
backed  up  by  labour-market  measures.  Foremost  among  these  should  be  more 
part-time working  and  new  negotiated arrangements  governing  retirement 
(e.g.  possibility of  part-time work  for  those  aged  55  or over)  in  such 
a  way  that  the  social  security system  is not  unduly  negatively  influenced. 
Both  unions  and  employers  must  be  willing to  seek  new  ways  of  combating 
unemployment,  stopping at  no  taboos.  In  the  case  of  Germany,  a  survey-based 
study  by  the  Institut  fur  Arbeitsmarkt- und  Berufsforschung  in  Nuremberg 
revealed that  employees  are strongly attracted by  the  idea  of  part-time as 
opposed  to full-time  working  even  where  this  involves  a  significant  reduction 
in  pay.  Polls  showed  that  some  16%  of  those  currently  in full-time  employment 
would  be  willing to work  part-time  23.  However,  in addition to  job-sharing 
and  a  lowering  of  the  flexible  retirement  age,  unions  and  employers  will 
need  to  reach  wider  agreement  on  other ways  reducing  working  hours. 
23 
See  C.  Brinkmann,  "Veranderung  des  Arbeitsvolumenangebots  bei 
_Realisierung  der  Arbeitszeitwunsche  :  Befragungsergebnisse  und 
Modellrechnungen",  in  Probleme  der  Messung  und  Vorausschatzung 
des  Frauenerwerbspotentials,  Beitr.  Arbeitsmarkt- und  Berufsforschung 
56,  1981,  pp.  147  et  seq •• 
This  te~de~cy  ~s affirmed  by  a  more  recent  survey  conducted  by  the 
EC  Comm1ss1on  1n  all member  countries.  According  to this  survey  more 
than one  quarter of  German  ·workers  questioned  would  like to work  shorter 
hours  than  they  do  today,  provided  that  their hourly  pay  remain  the  same 
<see  European  Economy,  Supplement  B,  N°  10,  October  1985). -~-
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